It is my intention in this paper to cast a look back over fifty years of reformational philosophizing. Together with you I want to ask: What have been the most important fruits of all the scholarly efforts that were made in the past within the Association for Calvinist Philosophy? It is also my intention to take a look ahead, to the extent that this is humanly possible. Let us ask what reformational philosophizing could mean for today"s situation, and for tomorrow"s.
1
What has this religious antithesis, this struggle between the risen Lord and "the power of darkness" (Col. 1:13), to do with our philosophizing? I would say:
Everything! It was Augustine who showed that the struggle between the city of God and the city of the evil one is world-wide in its scope. It was Calvin who showed that this struggle touches the entire man, yes, that even human reason is darkened and blind and dependent upon salvation. It was Abraham Kuyper who therefore warned against the spirit of Christian synthesis and accommodation in science and asserted that the science that issues from the saved life and born-again heart must be different from, yes, must be diametrically opposed to science as practiced in the non-Christian world. It was Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, finally, who, each in his own way, attempted to explain how the religious antithesis operates, how belief and unbelief penetrate into the world of science. Vollenhoven designed not only for systematic philosophy but even for the history of philosophy a practically brand new philosophical vocabulary. Dooyeweerd, in contrast, concerned about a Christian contribution to the philosophical discussion [104] in general, yes, to the philosophia perennis, introduced his own philosophical categories into the field only where strictly necessary.
During the post-war years the uncertainty increased. In the Netherlands and elsewhere the neocalvinist subculture lost its closed character. The framework of the kuyperian pattern of organization began to break up. And as the number of experts in our circle increased and our contacts with those of other minds became more frequent, the practical thrust of the religious antithesis became, if I am not mistaken, ever less clear.
Just consider for a moment our present situation! The world lies open to all, open also to the prevalent science. In today"s world, science is more powerful than ever before. It has become the number one cultural power. The cool calculations of our scientific experts have permeated practically all sectors of our existence. Scientific experts guide technology and dominate economic production, political activity, military logistics, world trade, yes, the communications systems of our information society. In such a scientized world does it still make sense to speak of antithesis and of a reformation of philosophy and science? Is the era of a separated, anti thetical scholarly praxis of the sort Kuyper could still call for in his Stone Lectures not for good and all a thing of the past? Are we not compelled, for better or for worse, to cooperate with and to accommodate ourselves to the operative scientific system with all its built-in values of control and domination, if we as Christians would still like to have at least some influence on behalf of what is good?
My response to such questions and suggestions is that I reject this dilemma of either separation or accommodation. The situation in which we find ourselves today as Christian scholars is really a missionary situation. It resembles that of the first Christians who had to carry the biblical message into an overwhelmingly apostate culture. It resembles too the situation one finds today in many mission fields.
There too the question arises of how the Christian gospel must be given concrete form in the presence of an existing socio-cultural system. Inasmuch as Christ claims the whole of life, a simple accommodation to the pagan cultural system is forbidden. But is our goal then to form there an alternative, Christian subculture or counterculture? Or will it be our aim that non-Christian peoples should learn to praise and serve God in ways expressive of their own culture and lifestyle?
In modern theory of missions a case is often made for "acculturation" or "indigenization". The question becomes one of precisely what these terms mean.
"Acculturation" or "indigenization" can mean accommodation, a process whereby the Christian message is simply adapted to the autochthonous culture. Here Kuyper, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd would rightly speak of synthesis.
"Acculturation" or "indigenization" can also mean something quite different, however, namely, arrest (an old gereformeerd word), that is, a process whereby peoples and nations with their indigenous cultural traditions surrender themselves to the rule of the risen Lord. Johan Bavinck, the missions theorist of the Free University in Amsterdam, made use in this connection of the concept of possession:
"the Christian life [105] does not accommodate or adapt itself to heathen forms of life, but it takes the latter in possession and thereby makes them new. Whoever is in Christ is a new creature."
3 In other words, it is Christ who as Lord of the world lays claim not only to the human soul but to all the concrete forms of culture in and through which man seeks to express himself. Acculturation means, thus regarded, a process of purification and consecration, in short, the transformation of a given culture into the service of Christ.
To return now to science and philosophy! Science and philosophy are exponents of Thus, more concretely speaking, key concepts in the sciences such as information and communication, repression and liberation, class struggle and human dignity, etc., etc., are not contraband the moment we find them in a humanistic theory or philosophy. Apart from their non-Christian background or from the horizontalistic perspective in which they are placed, many of these concepts represent valuable insights. Therefore it is my conviction that in many cases such concepts can and, indeed, should be de-ideologized and incorporated into a Christian perspective.
I have to add that the idea of transformational philosophy presupposes a recognizable, distinctive position of ourselves, in casu a distinctively Christian or, more specifically, reformational position. This is indispensable because such a recognizable point of departure is the very condition for the possibility for authentic transformation. Our own position, although we often stumble, is in Christ, and we take non-Christian thought into captivity as it were, for Christ (cf. II Cor. 10.5). The idea of transformational philosophy excludes by definition, however, the possibility of a separate alternative circuit of Christian scholarly praxis because it proceeds on the basis of the dynamic notion of possessio. I like to put it this way: reformational philosophy is at the same time transformational philosophy.
Do not forget that the work of science in non-Christian circles is also carried on in terms of transformation. What we presently understand by "modern secularization" is in fact nothing other than a process of transformation -I call it "inverse transformation" -that originated in the Renaissance and Enlightenment and entails the willful or unconscious categorical bending and systematic transformation of the Christian spiritual and [106] intellectual heritage in the spirit of humanism. I would even defend the thesis that practically the whole of modern humanistic philosophy derives from a transformation of the Christian inheritance. When Karl Marx, for example, speaks of "alienation" and "emancipation", then one can justifiably ask whether he has not appropriated these concepts and whether they do not originally belong to Christianity.
Hegel sensed something of these original claims of Christianity when he once characterized the whole of modern philosophy as "Philosophie innerhalb des Also with an eye to the future, I find the question of how we as reformational Christians should deal with the Bible in philosophy to be of "urgent importance.
We must try to arrive at a consensus. With that in mind, I will make three observations. First, it is striking that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd and so many .others with them have arrived within their philosophical reflections, despite their diverging views of Scripture, at conceptions they hold in common, for example, with regard to the religious antithesis; the distinction between God, law, and cosmos; sphere sovereignty; the central importance of the human heart, and much more.
This commonness of conviction indicates that the power of God"s Word is happily not directly dependent on our divergent reflections concerning it.
Next I want to say that these convictions which they and we hold to a great extent 10 See, e.g., H. Evan Runner, "The Relation of the Bible to Learning" and H. van Riessen, Wijsbegeerte. In his personal presentation of Dooyeweerd"s philosophy, H.J. van Eikema Hommes, in contrast, arrives at a complete rejection of "such external points of contact between biblical revelation and scientific problems", which are called "scholastic" in character and hence reveal the need for "an inner point of connection resident in the nature of scientific thought itself" (Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte van Herman Dooyeweerd, pp. 9, 11). motive" as long as it was not forgotten that in doing so they understood "scriptural" and "biblical" within the historical tradition of the "calvinist" worldview. The context provided by this worldview (which perhaps bore more strongly the stamp of selfevidence for them than it does for us) can be traced in retrospect as the binding element.
11 [109] I am well aware that my rather abrupt turn to the worldview context of our philosophy -in connection with which historical calvinism functions somewhat as a basic paradigm for our scholarly work is -is fraught with not insignificant systematic considerations. Perhaps some will experience this turn to matters of worldview as a historicizing, yes as a relativizing of our own position.
My position does not imply a kind of Christian relativism. But indeed, it does suggest on the one side that all philosophy as such has worldview roots: that will have to be shown. 12 This position implies on the other side that reformational philosophy is not simply founded in Scripture à la Vollenhoven, not simply driven by the central motivating power of God"s Word à la Dooyeweerd, but that it also has concrete historical roots: that will have to be taken into account! 13 11 Philosophy and worldview both have a religious starting point, so Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven maintain. The question however is whether philosophical thought is conditioned in its own turn by woridview. Although in Vollenhoven and even more so in Dooyeweerd there is a tendency to deny the latter, their standpoint on the issue is not entirely consistent. Vollenhoven writes: "What the view of life is to non-scientific knowledge, philosophy is to scientific knowledge" (`Schriftgebruik en wijsbegeerte", p. 8). Yet as it turns out, philosophy on the one hand and life and world view on the other are not completely separated in his conception, for he continues: `scientific knowledge never loses all traces of what is nonscientific". Dooyeweerd observes: "Philosophy cannot take the place of a life-and world-view, nor the reverse, for the task of each of the two is different" (A New Critique, vol. 1, p. 128); and elsewhere: "A life-and world-view may not be "elaborated" philosophically. It must elaborate itself (Ibid., p. 158). Nonetheless, he goes on to say also: "A life-and world-view should come to theoretical clarity in philosophic thought" (Ibid., p. 165). I call such state ments happy inconsistencies! 12 To accomplish that was the main reason I recently wrote Orientatie in de Nieuwe Filosofie. 13 The mediating role of the worldview between religion and philosophy has been presented clearly in our circles by A.M. Wolters, who writes in his Creation Regained: "Philosophical categories ... are themselves decisively shaped by a deeper-lying worldview" (p. 97). It remains unclear in this work however whether worldviews play a mediating role between religion and philosophy just in historical or also in systematical perspective. This question applies especially to the reformational worldview. Taking a systematic point of view, Wolters more or less identifies the reformational or calvinistic worldview with the biblical religion or "biblical worldview" in the normative sense. In contrast, he approaches other Christian worldviews from a historical point of view and considers them one-sided in their mediating role (p. 10). Cf. Proceeding from the idea of worldview-oriented philosophy, the divergence between Vollenhoven with his appeal to the witness of Holy Scripture and Dooyeweerd with his appeal to the inspiring power of the biblical ground motive seems less serious than it at first appeared. For in living with God"s Word the Christian receives both instruction and inspiration. 16 Both contribute to the deepening of his worldview as the binding framework for his philosophy. And yet, in this vision there is no need for converting such a "scriptural" philosophy itself into theology.
Philosophy, and Rationality". See further J.H. Olthuis, "On Worldviews"; and S. Griffioen, P. Marshall, and R. Mouw, eds., Worldview and Social Theory. 14 Cf. A. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, chs. 1 and 6. 15 In the conception of Dooyeweerd the "cosmonomic idea" (Dutch: wetsidee) is a limiting concept within philosophy regarding the coherence, unity and origin of all reality. It refers by way of philosophical approximation to three boundary problems: the mysteries of the world, of man, and of God (A New Critique, vol. 1, p. 101). In my view it is not so much religion (as ultimate commitment) as it is the worldview that can shed light on these mysteries, since in the worldview a view of man and a view of God are always inevitably included. See A. Kuyper, Lectures and Calvinism, p. 19 . 16 Calvin emphasizes both when he writes: "I call "service" not only what lies in obedience to God"s Word but what turns the mind of man, empty of its own carnal sense, wholly to the bidding of God"s Spirit" (Institutes, III, vii, 1). Transformation means however an active striving and struggling for the true perspective.
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Sphere sovereignty and creation ordinances:
The creational-messianic perspective (3)
One is tempted now to take up as a third central theme the theory of sphere sovereignty, for this theme has received a very great deal of attention in our considered it feasible to speak of "sphere sovereignty" in connection with them.
Finally, most surprising is the way in which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd tied the sociological and cosmological theories of sphere sovereignty together. The sphere sovereignty of the different social structures was said to be grounded in the sphere sovereignty of the modal aspects, since every social structure not only exhibits a complete scale of cosmic aspects but also is typified by one outstanding qualifying aspect. Thus the faith aspect would be distinctive for the church community, the jural aspect for the state, the ethical aspect for the family, the economic aspect for business life, and so forth.
This theory of "sovereign" modal aspects and the theory of "sovereign" social structures based on it have been elaborated especially by Dooyeweerd into an imposing architectonic system. Since Kuyper"s day it has become increasingly obvious that the doctrine of sphere sovereignty entails many theoretical implications but also far-reaching political and societal consequences. From it has developed, for example, a pluralist view of society which, especially in the Dutch political context, has been an important critical alternative to the choice between the collectivist or universalist conceptions of the state associated with classical socialism and the atomistic or individualist conceptions of society of classical liberalism.
Yet it must be acknowledged in all honesty that the doctrine of sphere sovereignty has evoked many questions both within our circle and outside the Association. One "Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) For a long time the doctrine of creation ordinances enjoyed a recognized place in the Christian church and especially in the churches of the Reformation. Then, in the nineteenth century, with the rise and influence of a neo-romantic, historicist philosophy of life, many Christian thinkers began to historicize the ordinances. What had grown and slowly basked to ripeness in history and did not seem to be in conflict with Holy Scripture was considered the expression of God"s will and was therefore to be regarded as an "ordinance". People opposed the French Revolution and other middle-class or proletarian revolutions that followed it on the grounds that they had overthrown historical and thus divine institutions. In short, the doctrine of creation ordinances began to smell of conservatism and restoration politics.
It was only in the twentieth century, however, with the rise of national socialism in With the help of this doctrine of a divine world order, Dooyeweerd wished to express that the whole of created reality -not only nature but also culture, history, human society -is and remains subject to the will of God the creator, no matter how sinful man deals with reality or with the whole of society. He has -correctly, I believe -declined to genuflect before either barthian theology or the modern philosophy of a contingent reality, of a confluent history, of a makeable society, of a self-creating man. Somewhere there is a limit to human autonomy and autocreation. Somewhere our modern societal experts" urge to control everything runs up against an impenetrable wall: the divine structural framework of the creation.
Within the Association Dooyeweerd"s and Vollenhoven"s emphasis on creation ordinances received a great deal of support. I think here especially of Zuidema. He took a certain pleasure in poking fun at all those left-radical Christians and progressive theologians who, as he put it in a deft play on words, had in their passion for social reform exchanged the beginselen (i.e., the principles or "beginnings") of God"s creation order for the "eindselen" (a term coined to stand for goals or "endings") of God"s kingdom. 21 Calvin even speaks of a "principle" when discussing the inner coherence of the creation and its renewal, and so says regarding man as the image of God: "For although I confess that these forms of speaking are synechdoches, yet this principle cannot be overthrown, that what was primary in the renewing of God"s image also held the highest place in the creation itself" (Institutes, I, xv, 4). In any case, such considerations eventually compelled me to abandon Zuidema"s vision of these matters. I have come to the conclusion that we must never take the biblical witness concerning God"s "statutes and ordinances" (Psalm 119) in isolation from or in opposition to the sublime vistas of the prophets and apostles.
There arises in that case as of itself an appalling, backwards-looking Christian conservatism that is blind to the dynamics of the creation. Precisely because of the messianic visions of the future, we have to turn our hearts and direct our attention forward. We have to decipher the eindselen, the eschatological symbols, in order to understand the beginselen, the protological ordinances. And vice versa! Only in such a "va et vient", 23 or better, in the way of "expecting" and "reflecting" may we discover all that God intended with His fallen creation "from the beginning".
I can alas not say that the idea of philosophy in creational-messianic perspective presented here has been typical during the last half century of the work in our circle.
One conspicuous exception, however, I must not fail to mention: professor Mekkes.
It was Mekkes who wrote: "To speak of creational ordinances as something in themselves is... impossible" and who therefore spoke beautifully of "structures under the rainbow". To prevent any misunderstanding Mekkes added: "but precisely this [rainbow] points towards its dynamic fulfillment". Therefore he could also argue elsewhere in polemics with Dooyeweerd: [Man] is subject to the future; it is [the future] which, through History, norms the creation".
24
In a world in which millions of people yearn for anchorage and in which the slums 22 Attractive in Nicholas Wolterstorff"s position is that he sees both: the creation perspective and the perspective of shalom, "Amsterdam" and "Lima". The weak side of his position to my mind is that the two perspectives have not been actually integrated: "The cultural mandate is insufficient as a grounding for the practice of scholarship. One meets as well the mandate to work for shalom" (Until Justice and Peace Embrace, p. 172).
23 I just borrow the expression from Paul Ricoeur. I take distance from its dialectical background, which is described by Ricoeur himself as a "dialectic with postponed synthesis" (Histoire et Verité, p. 16) . For the rest, I would recall that the symbolism of the apocalypse, particularly in Revelation 22, itself refers to the symbolism of the creation account. 24 J.P.A. Mekkes, Tijd der bezinning (1973), p. 60; Radix, tijd en kennen (1970) , p. 183. Already in Scheppingsopenbaring en wijsbegeerte (1961) we find the words: "The way of creation [is] the way of the Kingdom" (p. 90). See also H.G. Geertsema, who in his paper "Higher Education as Service to the King" starts (!) with "the Christian expectation" and subsequently relates it to "the order of God"s creation" (pp. 54-72).
"Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) 101-34
of Bombay and Rio de Janeiro cry out for justice, the prevalent secular science speaks only of facts and the knowledge of the facts without a design for the future. In opposition to that we must dare to spell out Mekkes"s words again: "the future norms". We must be mindful of the words of Levinas, who says that only the messianic triumph can overcome the brokenness of history, or the words of Adorno, who says that only the messianic perspective exposes injustice. 25 In our structural analyses of man [115] and society, of exchange rates and international finance, of human rights and political systems, we must speak in such a way of the creation order that people will come to recognize in the Prinzip Schöpfung the Prinzip Hoffnung and in "sovereign spheres" not just creation structures but something like Kingdom structures. A theory of "sovereign spheres" articulated as constellations of care or as fields of subservience or as resources of responsibility or as tokens of hope is more in keeping, I believe, with the messianic perspective than is a theory of "sovereign spheres" in which people cannot help hearing only "law and order".
26
It hardly seems necessary to show yet that the idea of philosophy in creationalmessianic perspective is very closely connected to the previously mentioned concepts of transformational and worldview-oriented philosophy. For we discovered that transformation always takes place in and from a worldview context. And we also discovered that within the worldview context of reformational Christians, the creational-messianic perspective is an indispensable ingredient.
The theme of meaning: Depth-hermeneutics as an approach (4)
The fourth central theme within reformational philosophy is the theme of meaning.
For that matter, a strong marginal note needs to be made here as well. All talk of the being of created reality in terms of "meaning" is from Dooyeweerd"s stable, not
Vollenhoven"s. Vollenhoven distinguished emphatically between the being of God, the being of the law, and the being of created reality, to be sure, because with Dooyeweerd he opposed in this way the classical scholastic doctrine of the analogia entis, the supposed analogy of being between God and what is created.
Moreover, Vollenhoven described the being of the law as "obtaining for" (gelden voor) and the being of created reality as "being subject to" (subjèct-zijn aan); that is, "Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) 101-34 © J Klapwijk -20 -he spoke of created reality"s being subject to the laws ordained for it by God, i.e., to obtaining laws. 27 Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge he always looked askance at the meaning-terminology that was coined to specify the ontological status of creation, afraid as he was of foreign elements creeping in.
In Dooyeweerd"s philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, the notion of meaning occupies the central position, as we know. Whether he derived it from neokantianism or from phenomenology is not particularly important, for Dooyeweerd gave the idea of meaning a content of his own. By it he wished to express on the one hand that there is not an analogy but a boundary between God and created reality, precisely because the latter is subject to His laws and ordinances.
He wished to express on the other hand that this created reality nonetheless refers beyond itself, yes, transcends itself in pointing in the direction of its divine Origin.
The most famous sentence from Dooyeweerd"s New Critique is probably this:
"Meaning is the being of all that has been created and the nature even of our self- 27 Vollenhoven, Isagooge Philosophiae, § § 13-18, pp. 12-16. 28 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, vol. I, p. 4 29 Dooyeweerd recognizes the problem, to be sure, when he asks, "Is sinful reality still meaning?" And then he acknowledges: "Here we indeed touch the deepest problem of Christian philosophy". But the answer follows, without restriction and without hesitation, on the same page: "Sinful reality remains apostate meaning under the law and under the curse of God"s wrath" (A New Critique, vol. 2, p. 33). The "Why?" of the Crucified One and so many cross bearers finds no echo here.
"Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) What are we to understand by "a Christian depth-hermeneutics in its own right"? I can only sketch its outlines here. First, it is "hermeneutics" because at both the theoretical and the pre-theoretical levels the meaning-character of reality eo ipso appeals to human meaning-experience in terms of understanding and interpreting.
Then, it is "depth-hermeneutics" because it will have to thrust through to the negativeness and nihilism hidden behind the given, positive phenomena. It is, finally, "in its own right" because it operates from a Christian pre-understanding.
Every "understanding" (Verständnis) is -just as hermeneutical theory since
Heidegger and Bultmann correctly asserts -necessarily imbedded in a "preunderstanding" (Vorverständnis). 34 We can accordingly not do otherwise than interpret reality philosophically from our pre-understanding, a Christian or (more concretely) reformational worldview.
Such a depth-hermeneutics is no small assignment! In one of his last writings the late professor. M. C. Smit warns correctly against the coercion of hermeneutical thinking. 35 According to him historical-hermeneutical "understanding" (Verstehen) is friendlier than causal-scientific "explaining" (Erklären), to be sure, but at the end of the day both are equally "totalitarian". For the hermeneutical way of thinking seeks to interpret everything from the all-encompassing context of a given structure, eyes open but lips sealed before the bitter puzzle of God"s good creation.
In other words, our concept of depth-hermeneutics represents a departure from "totalitarian" hermeneutics. Our concept means the denial of a universal horizon of understanding. It means in particular the denial of a universal history of understanding, in which -as Hans-Georg Gadamer asserts -the "life-world" or horizon of an original writer or agent and that of a current interpreter would in some way or another coalesce and fuse in the concentration upon the object to which the available texts, documents or other vestiges refer.
36
I believe that this so-called "fusion of horizons", which would occur time after time in our dealings with foreign or past phenomena and which would take place within an all-embracing "effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) that includes the interpretandum and the interpreter, can only be achieved to a certain extent. A universal horizon of understanding? As soon as we focus on a crucial phenomenon from the past or present -take the rise of Christianity, take the philosophy of the Enlightenment, take the class struggle, take the problem of rich countries and poor countries -between the interpreters there unavoidably arises a "conflict of interpretations" (P. Ricoeur), an irreconcilable conflict that ultimately has to do with error, with sin, with worldview contradictions and religious antithesis. The so-called Vollenhoven endorsed the idea of the heart as the central, religious selfhood of man in which all his functions have as it were their point of connection: in fact, that idea can already be found in Kuyper. 39 However, Vollenhoven had objections -very serious objections -to the idea of the supratemporality of the heart. It savored of a kind of dualism, a scheme of higher and lower, as if man"s heart were closer to God than the sum of all his functions (biblically speaking: the body). To obviate any such misconception Vollenhoven preferred to speak of the "heart and [its] mantle of functions", which we can perhaps best think of as an inner/outer scheme in which the heart as prefunctional source gives direction -for better or worse -to all functions and to all outer actions of man.
One attains a good view of this difference, however, only in conjunction with the more far-reaching philosophical considerations that were at stake for each of these thinkers. Dooyeweerd"s notion of the supratemporality of the heart was related to his philosophy as transcendental philosophy. (I shall return to this.) Vollenhoven"s notion of the heart as the "inner man" was related to his philosophy as covenantal philosophy, i.e., to his conception that the entire man is part of history: a history of God"s revelation and of the way in which man responds to it religiously. Given this convenantal intercourse of God with his people in the whole of salvation history, in which the heart of the One was able as it were to touch the hearts of the others, Vollenhoven systematically rejected the notion of the supratemporality of the heart.
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Given this background, it is actually strange that within the Association many have been inspired by both Dooyeweerd"s transcendental and Vollenhoven"s covenantal approach to man, as if they were not opposing views. Perhaps this twofold consideration is significant. At least, I would not be surprised if the real anthropological challenge for the Association in the coming decades turned out to lie in the problem of how Dooyeweerd"s abstract and transcendental approach, which is of importance for the discussion with modern humanist philosophers, can be reconciled with Vollenhoven"s concrete and historical approach, which seems to me to be of much more importance for a serious dialogue with Jewish scholars. answer that he gives, a locus classicus, is eccentric through and through: "Again, it is certain that man never achieves a clear knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon God"s face, and then descends from contemplating Him to scrutinize himself".
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It is known that these words of Calvin"s concerning the primordial and radical connectedness of man to God were dear to heart not only to Vollenhoven but also to Dooyeweerd. What I want to notice, however, is that such an eccentric vision, taken in itself, may be found in a non-Christian context as well, especially amongst Jewish thinkers. Martin Buber had it in mind when he spoke of "the apriori of connection". Emmanuel Levinas testifies to it when he speaks of "the exceptional conjunction of finite man with God". 44 In short, that man can understand himself only in confrontation with a divine "Thou" is not a Christian monopoly or a calvinist exclusivum.
Anyone desiring to appropriate Calvin"s words in their authentic Christian sense should read them in the context of the entire argument of the Institutes. And that context is historical through and through! For Calvin teaches that the connection between the knowledge of God and man"s self-knowledge was implanted by nature and that since then it has been corrupted by the Fall of man and is imprinted anew in the children of God. Yes, Calvin takes express notice of "how God works in men"s hearts" throughout the whole of history: the times of law and gospel, of 42 Vollenhoven, Isagoogè Philosophiae, p. 96. 43 Calvin, Institutes, I, i, 12. 44 M. Buber speaks of "das Apriori der Beziehung; das eingeborene Du' (Das Dialogische Prinzip, p. 31). E. Levinas refers to "la conjonction extraordinaire de l"homme fini et mortal et d"un Dieu infini et "absolument autre"" ("Religion et idée de l"infini").
Christ and church, etc., etc. I only want to say that this Christian, classically [121] reformational reflection on the eccentric starting point of all hermeneut ical activity does not carry us out of time, no, it guides us into time, into the mysteries of the past, present, and future, yes, of the messianic perspective.
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In short, two lines of thought are of importance to us. First, we must retain (see section 6) Dooyeweerd"s transcendental approach to man. In this transcendental approach Dooyeweerd makes clear that man is never completely absorbed into the multiplicity of his functions. As a person he is one. Next, we must also take Calvin seriously in his speaking of the particular character of man"s self-knowledge before the face of God. Calvin shows that man is historical and on the move even in his deepest self-consciousness. Unity and historicity go hand in hand.
Beyond the consideration of man"s historicity lies an even more far-reaching question, that of human finitude and mortality. Thus I can also say that the fundamental unity of man goes hand in hand with his finitude and mortality, and that this unity must not be taken at the expense of his finitude and mortality.
I know that in speaking of man"s finitude and mortality we are touching upon a long neglected chapter from the history of philosophy. But the doctrine of the "immortal soul" cherished since the Greeks is not only highly speculative, as is widely agreed nowadays, but also highly unscriptural. The Bible teaches bluntly that "it is appointed unto men once to die" (Heb. 9:27) and that God only has "immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto" (I Tim. 6:16). There is no immortal human soul. Mortal man can count on nothing else, and need not count on anything else, than that entirely personal word of Jesus uttered at the grave of his friend from Bethany: "Lazarus, come forth" (John 11:43).
Given this background, it has to be said then that human self-consciousness, the transcendental unity of the human person, cannot be concentrically anchored in the so-called supratemporality of the human heart. It can only be hidden eccentrically in an apriori relation: a relation of transcendental openness to the eternal God, as He has become manifest in the Son of Man. In other words, man"s ek-centricity is centered in the holy unrest of the Son of Man who carries mankind with him on his way from the Cross of shame to the Kingdom of shalom.
In this eccentric starting point, in this statute of man as temporal but transcending openness to the eternal One, lies for me also the clue for our conception of depthhermeneutics. The idea of the supratemporal heart is replaced by the notion of man"s eccentricity, i.e., the ek-sistential struggle of man the wayfarer for an ever deeper understanding of God and, correlated to that, his struggle for an ever truer Selbstverständnis and Weltverständnis. 46 On this basis we might perhaps even assert that in the [122] Gottesfrage, that is, in the question "Who is God?" lies the ultimate mysticism and motor of the entire process of transformational understanding. And this pertains then not just to humanity as a whole in its uncertain passage towards the future, it touches also the seeking and probing of the individual, finite person.
Critique of knowledge: The transcendental-hermeneutical turn (6)
As we look back we can say that in at least one area of central concern Dooyeweerd clearly scores higher than Vollenhoven: in his attention to a transcendental critique of According to John Kraay this is really what the later Dooyeweerd also had in mind: "The heart of man is nothing other than the ek-sistent self-transcendence toward God, fellow-man, and cosmos" ("Successive Conceptions in the Development of the Christian Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd", p. 35). Yes, according to Kim, in Dooyeweerd man"s heart is his ek-sistentiality, "wie sie geschichtlich, gesellschaftlich vermittelt ist" (Wissen and Glauben", p. 131). Although perhaps too free as interpretations, in some ways these are, it seems to me, necessary corrections. 47 that "meaning is the being of all that has been created", and attempted to apply it to theory and science. In other words, if indeed the whole of created reality has meaning-character and forms as it were a window upon the Eternal (however steamed up and dirty the glass may be), then science cannot be left out as if it were a piece that has been knocked out of the frame or even as a fleck etched into a transparent pane. If the soli Deo gloria eventually will be written even upon the harness of the horses -I refer here to the prophet Zechariah (Zech. 14:20) -then will man"s intellectual harness be by definition an exception? Making the structure of theoretical thought transparent -that is for me the greatness of Dooyeweerd"s transcendental critique.
And yet transcendental criticism of theoretical thought seems to me to be part of a broader transcendental task. One can ask whether Dooyeweerd did not perhaps allow himself to be drawn too far by his neokantian opponents when he attributed such an exclusive importance to his transcendental critique of scientific theory. Husserl and 48 See Zuidema, "Transcendentale problemen", Geertsema, "Transcendentale openheid", Mekkes, "Bijdrage"; Th. de Boer, "De filosofie van Dooyeweerd", A New Critique, vol. 1, 49 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, vol. 1, p. 38. 50 For this reason I also share De Boer"s view that the Christian-religious ground motive, as it is presented by Dooyeweerd, must be regarded as a "hermeneutical guideline" ("De filosofie van Dooyeweerd", pp. 248, 251, 258, 260) . Indeed, if creaturely reality is not self-contained, if it refers forward and beyond itself dynamically, then creaturely reality conveys the scholar who seeks to follow it 51 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, vol. 1, p. 38. 52 Mekkes, Tijd der bezinning, [81] [82] Van Riessen, Wijsbegeerte, p. 26.
"Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) 101-34 in this hermeneutically to the area of boundaries. Then not only the question "How is theoretical thought possible?" but also the question "How is human language possible?" or "How can human freedom articulate itself?" or "How is a just social praxis possible?" leads to transcendental reflection. In the continuation we shall call this broadened and more dynamic transcendental reflection "transcendental hermeneutical" reflection. 57 However, where can we find this point of contact, from which all authentic understanding starts? It is naturally not in 54 I take distance here from the language used by K.-O. Apel. Apel speaks of a "transcendentalhermeneutical synthesis" which would be proper to the pre-theoretical constitution of the Lebenswelt (Heidegger, Wittgenstein) and which would found the kantian synthesis of apperception. See Apel, Transformation der Philosophic, vol. 1, pp. 246, 308 . I reject however the notion of pretheoretical "synthesis" and prefer the notion of "systasis", i.e., the oneness (één-zijn) of man and world, subject and object, in pre-scientific experience. Transcendental hermeneutical reflection can for the rest not be called pre-scientific, because and insofar as it is explicitly engaged in tracing man"s transcendental openness. 55 Mekkes, Tijd der bezinning, 57 . That transcendental-hermeneutical reflection occurs elsewhere as well needs no argument. Naturally, perspectives change. One may think of Heidegger and his idea of the "abyss", of Levinas and his idea of "the infinite", of M. Polanyi and his idea of a "tacit dimension" 56 Mekkes, Tijd der bezinning, p. 39; cf. pp. 48, 66, 73. 57 Ibid., pp. 39, 43, 46, 55, 58 .
"Reformational philosophy on the boundary between the past and the future" Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987) A word of caution I must still add here. As we saw, the new, transcendentalhermeneutical reflection has a broader scope than the traditional, transcendentalcritical reflection (in its almost exclusive concern with the structure of theoretical reason). Yet in its own turn it naturally cannot permit itself, out of reaction, to pass over the problem of the structural conditions of the phenomenon we call theoretical science. Given the scientization of the modern world, to which we referred before, reflection on the phenomenon of science, which Dooyeweerd initiated with such tremendous power of conviction, remains for us an urgent task of the moment, a
Gebot der Stunde.
What the outcome of this reflection will be we can only surmise. It will, I believe, lead to a different formulation of transcendental questions than we were accustomed to in Dooyeweerd. I have two suggestions to make in this regard. First, it has to be seen whether a transcendental-hermeneutical reflection on the eccentricity of man will not require a major overhaul of the transcendental idea of totality. Besides that, we shall have to see whether a transcendental-hermeneutical reflection on the creational-messianic perspective does not lead us to the idea of (final) destination From a transcendental critique of knowledge to the subject of history and culture -that is a leap from the most abstract to the most concrete, from the hidden presuppositions to the everyday context in which the philosopher together with all his fellow men may experience his responsibility. How did the theme "history" or "history and culture" fare amongst reformational philosophers, especially within the Association for Calvinist Philosophy?
To my mind, the Association has in the past been marked by something of a love/hate attitude towards history. A loving concern for history was inherited, as it were, by reformed philosophers from Groen van Prinsterer and Kuyper, who had both steeped themselves not only in church history and the nation"s history but likewise in the spiritual developments of modern times.
The hatred came from an entirely different quarter. In the years following the Great War Europe was inundated by neoromantic, vitalistic, and historicist literature, a literature that gushed exaggeratedly about the traditional cultural community and even apart from science -is in any case worldview-laden. At the same time, I assume that an element of theory has been integrated into practically every modern worldview -think of evolutionism or of historical materialism. In Popper too as it turns out the "theory" that is said to be presupposed in observation amounts more generally to a "point of view". It can, so he holds, be a theory but also a general expectation or a myth. With regard to Vollenhoven"s conception of history, see especially his Isagooge Philosophiae, § § 113-34, pp. 74-98. In "Problemen van de tijd in onze kring" Vollenhoven notes that he "already in 1929 in a debate wih Dooyeweerd openly differed with him in opinion regarding the modal character of history". Naturally, it remains a question whether Dooyeweerd"s conception of history, substantively speaking, is not more than modal. In Dutch he preferred to describe this modal history not as "cultural development" but more broadly as "development of civilization" (beschavingsontwikkeling). Compare, e.g., A New Critique, vol. 1, pp. 267, vol. 2, pp. 187, [296] [297] [298] [299] [300] see also p. 143. 64 With regard to Mekkes and his "hermeneutics of history", which is directed towards the entire "history of creation", see especially Radix, tijd en kennen, e.g. pp. 226, 230. With regard to K.J. Popma and his conception of "creation history", see Evangelie en geschiedenis, e.g. pp. 306 . See also the more extensive analysis by J. Klapwijk, "Geloof en geschiedenis". Because Dooyeweerd had more than one arrow on his bowstring, his construction perhaps still makes the strongest impression. In all the others the boundaries of history blurred, as they did in historicism too. Moreover, their philosophies of history often came to look suspiciously like theologies of history. And the question of the point of connection with the historian"s field of research was systematically evaded.
Dooyeweerd at least was able to lend credence to the idea that practicing historians, to avoid being overwhelmed by their material, consciously or unconsciously apply a criterion of selection, though there may be differences of opinion with Dooyeweerd concerning its modal character. 66 Fifty years after its founding, the Association faces as perhaps its most urgent task, as I see it: profiling its view of history and culture. The spirit of historicism, if I am not mistaken, is more virulent than ever. And Dooyeweerd"s antidote -the idea of a restricted, monomodal history -is of no avail. Do not forget that since the forties there has been a veritable explosion of historical subdisciplines: besides the traditional political, military and diplomatic history we have economic history, social history, cliometrics, the history of ideas, the history of mentalities, psychohistory, and much more. In the face of so much diversity, Dooyeweerd"s monomodal conception of history can no longer be convincing. But Dooyeweerd"s intermodal approach to history -to concentrate on that nowis also anything but convincing. The question "How (even in a secularized world) the entire unfolding process is possible in all normative meaning-aspects" has so many romantic-organismic, progressivistic and universal-historical connotations that it must be considered a speculative product of the German idealist metaphysics of history (as one encounters it time and again in Abraham Kuyper, too, for that matter) rather than an outgrowth, as Dooyeweerd would have it, of an authentically "Christian philosophy of history". 67 In earlier sections I called for a transformational and hermeneutical interpretation of our created and disfigured reality from a creational and messianic perspective. What I have just done is to mark the difference between such a creational-messianic perspective and the so-called Western-oriented idea of unfolding. That difference is not negligible. Naturally, the creational-messianic perspective, as I see it, is also focussed on unfolding, on the full unfolding of the meaning of the creation, and thus also of the meaning of history. But this creational-messianic perspective belongs in my opinion to the worldview context, the hermeneutical horizon for the Christian understanding of reality. That protological-eschatological perspective of meaning-disclosure guides but also trans-[130]cends all theory. That perspective can neither be constructed theoretically (in terms of a speculative idea of cultural disclosure) nor be realized practically (in terms of a revolutionary program for societal change).
In fifty years" time the world has changed drastically. Transportation technologies and communications media have thrown it open at a tremendous tempo. We are confronted with a diversity of cultural traditions, from Latin America to the. Far East. We are facing a global encounter, not a global unfolding of cultures. However, the encounter of cultures has really yet to begin. Here there can be no thought of a hegemony of western culture or western Christianity, but at most of the biblical rule -as Van der Hoeven once remarked -that "the elder shall serve the younger" (Gen. 25:23).
72
The idea of transformational philosophy is grafted to this world situation.
Transformational philosophy taken in the Christian sense presents itself in all modesty as a philosophy in loco: a philosophy "at the spot". It does not install itself beforehand in some supposed universal process of culture or of Western development à la the high-flown model of Hegel and his followers. It takes the concrete historical cultural situation, including its intellectual heritage, as its hermeneutical starting point and the creational-messianic perspective as its scriptural view of history... knows that the great antithesis between the ground motive of the divine revelation of the Word and the ground motive of the apostate spirit operates [in history] in the power struggle for the future of western civilization" (p. 108). Yes, Dooyeweerd at one point even calls the Dutch national character, in view of its calvinistic bent, its humaneness, its sober life-style, and the like, a "normative type" of historical disclosure and differentiation (p. 82). See also the striking analysis by C.T. McIntire in "Dooyeweerd"s Philosophy of History", especially pp. 104-5, together with the nuanced criticism of S. Griffioen in "De betekenis van Dooyeweerd"s ontwikkelingsidee", 72 Thus J. van der Hoeven in an article with the telling title, " Ontwikkeling in het licht van ontmoeting" [Development in the light of encounter], p. 159.
